The 10b-5 Daily

The decision in the Fogarazzo research analyst case in the S.D.N.Y. (previously posted about in The 10b-5 Daily) is controversial on a number of pleading issues. Not only does the court apply a loss causation standard that, in contravention of the Second Circuit, appears to remove the need to draw any actual connection between the misrepresentations and the loss, it also runs roughshod over other S.D.N.Y. decisions on how to analyze the falsity and scienter (i.e., fraudulent intent) requirements for securities fraud claims based on statements of opinion.

In the research analyst cases, the issue is whether the defendants deliberately misrepresented their truly held opinion that the stock was not a good investment. Judges in the S.D.N.Y. (e.g., Judge Lynch in the Podany decision) have found that under these circumstances the falsity and scienter requirements are essentially identical. Since the statement (unlike a statement of fact) cannot be false at all unless the speaker is knowingly misstating his truly held opinion, the plaintiffs must allege inconsistent statements or actions by the defendants from which a factfinder could infer that a knowing misstatement was made. For example, the plaintiffs might allege that the defendants’ made statements to others that the stock was overvalued or engaged in personal sales of the stock.

In Forgarazzo, Judge Scheindlin rejected this approach. After finding that falsity must be examined separately from scienter, the court held that the falsity of the analysts’ buy recommendations was adequately plead based on allegations that the defendants: (1) wanted to obtain investment banking business from the underlying company; (2) had analysts that were subject to financial conflicts of interest; and (3) failed to maintain adequate controls to protect the objectivity of their public research. None of these allegations, however, suggests that the analyst reports were false (i.e., that the defendants actually regarded the underlying stock as a poor investment). In essence, the court found that the existence of a motive to commit fraud is enough to demonstrate that the opinions were false.

Holding: Motion to dismiss denied.

The argument that loss causation must be plead by showing a stock price decline related to the alleged fraud, articulated in the Second Circuit by the Emergent Capital decision, is meeting with increased resistance by the S.D.N.Y. judges handling the research analyst cases. Judges have argued that the stock market crash that occured between the issuance of the allegedly biased research and the revelation of the analysts’ conflicts of interest (and, therefore, arguably caused any loss) was irrelevant, either because of allegations that the research analyst directly participated in a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by the issuer of the underlying stock or because the revelation of the analysts’ conduct caused a subsequent stock price drop. (See these posts on the WorldCom and Robertson Stephens cases).

In Fogarazzo v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., 2004 WL 1151542 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2004), however, the entire concept of the price decline approach to pleading loss causation comes under attack. The complaint, brought by shareholders of RSL Communications, Inc. (“RSL”), alleged that analysts at three firms had falsified their opinions of RSL. Specifically, while RSL issued a series of negative announcements in 1999 and 2000 – and its stock price dropped – the analysts continued to provide RSL with positive ratings. Ultimately, RSL’s stock declined to the point that it was delisted, and each of the three firms then dropped analyst coverage. The court was careful to note that there were no allegations that the defendants concealed any facts concerning RSL. Instead, the plaintiffs merely alleged that despite publicly available negative information, the analysts expressed falsely positive opinions.

Although the facts are similar to those in the Merrill Lynch cases, Judge Scheindlin appears to create a new loss causation standard and concludes that loss causation was adequately plead. The court explained that loss causation is shown when “(1) the misrepresentation artificially inflated the value of the security, or otherwise misrepresented its investment quality, and (2) the subject of the misrepresentation causedthe decline in the value of the security.” Here, the subject of the misrepresentations was “the financial health and future prospects of RSL,” and though no facts were concealed, that subject still caused plaintiffs’ losses. “[E]ven though the true facts were available to the world to see, by affirmatively opining on the meaning of those facts, the Banks obscured the logical conclusion that RSL was failing.” This standard would appear to remove the need to draw any actual connection between the misrepresentations and the loss; the mere fact that the company’s stock price declined creates liability for anyone who issued false statements about the company into the market.

Moreover, although Judge Scheindlin expressed uncertainty as to whether the Second Circuit’s price decline approach requires a corrective disclosure, the court concluded that dropping analyst coverage of RSL was a corrective disclosure. “[W]hen the Banks dropped coverage, they essentially conceded (in the eyes of the investing public) that their previous recommendations were mistaken.” Even accepting this characterization of the banks’ actions (and it is hard to see how dropping coverage can be equated with a disclosure about the previous recommendations), the court did not find that there was a price decline after coverage was dropped.

As noted previously, clarification of these issues may come in the near future. The Second Circuit is scheduled to hear the appeal of the first few Merrill Lynch decisions on August 12, 2004.

Holding: Motion to dismiss denied. (The 10b-5 Daily may do an additional post about the other holdings in the opinion.)

As noted in The 10b-5 Daily’s discussions of the Intergroup and NUI decisions, the idea that corporate acquisitions for stock are a sufficient motive for securities fraud is controversial. A contrary view can be found in the recent decision in In re Corning Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 1056063 (W.D.N.Y. April 9, 2004).

In the Corning case, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were motivated to artificially inflate the company’s stock price so that they could use it as currency for the acquisition of Tropel Corporation. The court found that “[p]aying a smaller price for the acquisition of Tropel [by using inflated stock] benefited Corning’s common shareholders.” Moreover, the desire to have a high stock price to be used in the purchase of Tropel “is a motive that could be attributed to virtually every company seeking to acquire another through the use of its own stock as part of the purchase.” As a result, the court held that the acquisition failed to create a strong inference of scienter.

Holding: Motion to dismiss granted.