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Fifty Person Limit

The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”) precludes any “covered class action” based upon state law that alleges a misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of nationally traded securities.  The defendants are permitted to remove the case to federal district court for a determination as to whether the case is precluded by the statute.  If so, the district court must dismiss the case; if not, the district court must remand the case back to state court.

SLUSA has a bifurcated definition of “covered class action” for a single lawsuit.  The action qualifies as a covered class action when (in relevant part) either (a) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or prospective class members; or (b) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a representative basis on behalf of themselves and other unnamed parties similarly situated.

In Nielen-Thomas v. Concorde Investment Services, LLC, 2019 WL 302766 (Jan. 24, 2019 7th Cir.), the Seventh Circuit considered whether a putative class action meeting all of the other requirements for SLUSA preclusion, but brought on behalf of “between thirty-five and forty-nine members,” should be allowed to proceed in state court.  The plaintiffs argued that the two definitions of “covered class action” were “separate, independent bases for excluding securities class actions from SLUSA’s proscriptions” so that being excluded under one was sufficient, or, alternatively, the fifty-person threshold must apply to both definitions to avoid making the second definition superfluous.  The Seventh Circuit disagreed.

The Seventh Circuit found that while there was an overlap between the two definitions, each had a separate meaning.  Under the first definition, the action could “be treated as a class action even if all plaintiffs are identified in the complaint and no plaintiff is pursuing claims as a representative on behalf of others, if there are more than fifty such plaintiffs and SLUSA’s other requirements are met.”  The second definition, in contrast, “includes any action brought as a putative class action in the traditional Rule 23 meaning of the term.”  The Seventh Circuit also found that this interpretation is consistent with SLUSA’s purpose and legislative history, noting that Congress wanted to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing the barriers to federal securities class actions by simply filing them in state court (no matter how large the size of the class).  Because the case before the court clearly was a putative class action, it fell within the second definition and was precluded.

Holding: Dismissal affirmed.

Quote of note:  “To the extent the identities of any of the other putative class members are known, and these individuals wish to pursue claims on their own behalf in state court under state law, nothing in SLUSA prevents them from doing so (provided there are fewer than fifty such plaintiffs for which common questions of law or fact predominate).  What SLUSA does preclude these individuals from doing is continuing to pursue their claims in the form of a class action.”

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Back In The Saddle

After fifteen years of publishing The 10b-5 Daily, it was good to take a short sabbatical!  But with the new year, this blog is back up and running.  So let’s get to it.

On Friday, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian, setting up a battle over actions brought under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act.

In its petition, Emulex presented the following question:

Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly held, in express disagreement with five other courts of appeals, that Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 supports an inferred private right of action based on a negligent misstatement or omission made in connection with a tender offer.

The direct question presented is a narrow dispute over the Section 14(e) state of mind requirement – i.e., does a private plaintiff need to show that the defendant acted with negligence or scienter (i.e., fraudulent intent)?  That said, there are a few ways the case could have a broader impact.

First, although the question presented refers to a “private right of action,” any determination as to the required state of mind also would apply to actions brought by the government.

Second, there is a related statutory provision – Section 14(a) – that addresses misstatements or omissions made in connection with proxy solicitations.  The state of mind requirement for actions brought under Section 14(a) also is the subject of a circuit split and may be impacted by the Court’s decision.

Finally, there is some question as to whether there should be an inferred private right of action under Section 14(e) at all (despite the fact that a number of lower courts have found that one exists).  In its amicus brief filed in support of the cert petition, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce argued that the Court should address this threshold issue and find that only the government can bring an action to enforce Section 14(e).

Stay tuned.

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Mr. Roberts Moves Firms

On a personal note, Lyle Roberts (the author of The 10b-5 Daily) has joined the Washington, DC office of Shearman & Sterling LLP.  The firm’s press release can be found here.  Posting has been correspondingly light, but something new should be up soon!

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Two Bites At The Apple

In Halliburton II, the U.S. Supreme Court held that defendants can rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance at the class certification stage with evidence of a lack of stock price impact.  There are at least two different points, however, when stock price impact might be relevant: (a) the date of the alleged misstatement, and (b) the date of the alleged corrective disclosure.  Is it enough for defendants to provide evidence of a lack of stock price impact as of the date of the alleged misstatement?

In In Re Finisar Corp. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 6026244 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017), the plaintiffs alleged that a December 2010 statement misled investors as to the nature of Finisar’s growth by denying that the company’s revenue increase was the result of an unsustainable inventory build-up by customers.  The complaint also stated that Finisar’s stock price increased after the statement was issued.

At class certification, the defendants presented an expert report demonstrating that any increase in Finisar’s stock price following the alleged misstatement was not statistically significant “when the price is adjusted for general market and industry trading.”  Among other objections, the plaintiffs asserted that the expert report was “flawed insofar as it fails to consider Finisar’s stock price change following the allegedly corrective disclosure” that occurred several months later.  The court acknowledged that for purposes of price impact analysis, many courts have focused on the corrective disclosure date, especially where there may have been offsetting disclosures about the company on the date of the alleged misstatement or the plaintiffs had alleged that the misstatement maintained the stock price at an artificially-inflated level.  (For more on the “price maintenance theory,” see here and here.)

In the instant case, however, the court found that neither of those rationales for focusing on the corrective disclosure date were applicable.  There was no evidence that other information about Finisar had offset any price inflation caused by the alleged misstatement and the plaintiffs were not proceeding on a price maintenance theory.  Under these circumstances, the court found no flaw in the expert analysis “simply because it focuses on the date of the alleged misstatement rather than the date of the alleged corrective disclosure.”

Holding: Class certification denied.

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Cyan Argued

On Tuesday, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund case, which addresses the preemptive scope of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).   At issue in the case is whether SLUSA divests state courts of jurisdiction over class actions asserting claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 (e.g., claims alleging a material misstatement in a registration statement).

The question before the Court is closely tied to Congress’s intent in enacting SLUSA.  In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) to protect corporate defendants from meritless securities class actions.   The PSLRA, however, only applied to federal cases.  To evade the PSLRA’s impact, plaintiffs began filing securities class actions in state court, usually based on state law causes of action.

Congress passed SLUSA to close this loophole.  Due to unclear drafting, however, there has been confusion in the lower courts over whether SLUSA also makes federal court the sole venue for class actions alleging Securities Act claims (which historically enjoyed concurrent jurisdiction in state or federal court).  In Cyan, the parties have put forward three competing interpretations of SLUSA.  The Petitioners (Defendants) contend that SLUSA divests state courts of jurisdiction over class actions asserting Securities Act claims, thereby insuring that those cases must be litigated in federal court.  The Solicitor General maintains that SLUSA permits the removal of class actions asserting Securities Act claims, thereby also allowing those cases to be heard in federal court.  Finally, the Respondents (Plaintiffs) contend that SLUSA did not address class actions asserting Securities Act claims at all, meaning that once in state court they are not removable to federal court.

The parties’ textual arguments require having SLUSA in one hand and a yellow highlighter in the other.  In the end, however, the text of the statute might not end up having much sway over the Court.  The justices expressed varying degrees of frustration in trying to parse through the specific statutory language to reach a result, with Justice Alito, in particular, repeatedly referring to the relevant provisions as “gibberish” and noting that “all the readings that everybody has given to all of these provisions are a stretch.”

Petitioners and the Solicitor General appeared to have more success on the issue of Congressional intent.  Petitioners’ counsel drew an analogy to building a house, suggesting that it was nonsensical to believe that Congress would have barred the front door against the bringing of securities class actions in state court asserting state law claims, while simultaneously leaving the back door open for plaintiffs to bring securities class actions in state court asserting federal law claims.  Moreover, if securities class actions asserting federal law claims go forward in state court, they are not subject to the PSLRA’s procedural protections, a result that Congress presumably wanted to avoid.

Several justices picked up on this theme, with Justice Ginsburg asking Respondents’ counsel “why would Congress want to do that” given that you end up with “the federal claim in state court, and none of those [PSLRA] restrictions apply”?  Similarly, Justice Alito expressed incredulity that Congress would want to bar “a claim in state court under a state cause of action that mirrors the ’33 Act” but then allow “the state court to be able to entertain the real thing, an actual ’33 Act [claim].”  Respondents’ counsel answered that if Congress was concerned about the “evasion of the PSLRA” in securities class actions alleging Securities Act claims, there were “10 different easier ways and more clear ways” that it could have removed the existence of concurrent jurisdiction for those cases (but it did not).  Justices Kagan and Sotomayor appeared sympathetic to that position, with Justice Kagan noting that “Congress did everything it wanted with respect to actions [under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934], which are the lion’s share of securities lawsuits.”

A decision is expected sometime early next year.

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Rites of Confession

When does a company have a duty to disclose hidden wrongdoing?  As many courts have noted, disclosure is not a “rite of confession” and a company does not have a general obligation to tell investors whether some (or all) of its gains are ill-gotten.  Because of an exception that tends to swallow the rule, however, corporate defendants are often disappointed when they attempt to invoke this principle to defeat securities fraud claims.

In In re VEON Ltd. Sec. Lit., 2017 WL 4162342 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017), the court considered whether VEON’s public filings were rendered false or misleading by its failure to disclose that it had violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by making, or attempting to make, “millions of dollars in improper payments to Gulnara Karimova, the eldest daughter of the Uzbekistan’s President, in an effort to achieve favorable treatment in Uzbekistan.”  The defendants argued that there was no dispute over the accuracy of VEON’s financial statements (bribery notwithstanding), so the plaintiffs’ claims were “in reality, an improper attempt to enforce the FCPA, which has no private right of action.”

The court agreed that VEON had no general duty to disclose the FCPA violations and that the company’s actual financial reporting was accurate.  The court noted, however, that a “duty to disclose may arise when a company puts the topic of the cause of its financial success at issue.”  Of course, most companies make disclosures about the causes of their financial success.  The court found that VEON’s attribution of its growth in Uzbekistan to things like its “sales and marketing efforts,” without mentioning the bribes, was an actionable misstatement.  Moreover, VEON had made a specific disclosure about owners of telecommunications networks in Uzbekistan enjoying “equal protection guaranteed by law,” which the court held was rendered misleading by the fact that VEON had to pay bribes to operate in the country.  Finally, the court concluded that the facts admitted in VEON’s deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ made it clear that the company’s statements about having adequate internal controls were false.

Holding: Motion to dismiss granted in part and denied in part.

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Top 100 Settlements

With the dog days of summer comes the issuance of statistical reports on securities class actions.  ISS Securities Class Actions puts out an interesting report, now updated through 2016, on “The Top 100 U.S. Settlements of All Time.”  As it turns out, “all time” is actually from the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 forward, but the report breaks down the settlements by amount, lead plaintiff, lead counsel, claims administrator, and the presence of a financial restatement.

Highlights:

(1) Six of the “Top 100 U.S. Settlements” were in the second half of 2016: Caremark, Genworth Financial, Household Int’l, Band of America, Pfizer, and MF Global Holdings.

(2) The plaintiffs’ firms with the most settlements on the list are Bernstein Litowitz (35 settlements) and Robbins Geller (17 settlements).

(3) Forty-three of the “Top 100 U.S. Settlements” have involved financial restatements.

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