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The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) establishes a statutory scheme for the selection of a lead plaintiff in a securities class action.  Under the PSLRA, the presumptive lead plaintiff is the applicant with the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class, but that presumption may be rebutted by “proof by a member of the purported plaintiff class that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff . . . will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; or . . . is subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the class.”  But what is the applicable standard of proof that the member of the plaintiff class must satisfy in providing this rebuttal?

While the PSLRA is silent on that issue, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has now weighed in.  In In re Crain Walnut Shelling, LP, 2026 WL 1252327 (9th Cir. May 7, 2026), the district court found that Crain Walnut’s status as the presumptive lead plaintiff had been successfully rebutted by another lead plaintiff applicant based on a showing that Crain Walnut had made inaccurate statements about its ownership structure and demonstrated an unwillingness to fully participate in discovery.  While the district court initially applied a “genuine and serious doubts” standard of proof (based on language in earlier Ninth Circuit decisions analyzing the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provisions), upon reconsideration it also found that the stricter “preponderance of the evidence” standard had been met. 

Crain Walnut petitioned for a writ of mandamus to vacate the district court’s order.  The Ninth Circuit denied the petition, finding that the district court did not commit clear error, but also wrote separately to clarify that the required standard of proof under the PSLRA is “preponderance of the evidence.” In support of its holding, the Ninth Circuit noted that “preponderance of the evidence” is both the default standard of proof in civil litigation and generally applies to “adequacy determinations” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Holding: Mandamus petition denied.

Quote of note: “The determination as to a presumptive lead plaintiff’s adequacy or typicality under the PSLRA does not change the plaintiff’s separate entitlements in a securities class action (the plaintiffs can still vindicate their rights in a separate action) or abridge the defendant’s rights in any manner.  Like a class representative being chosen in the Rule 23 context, the appointment of a lead plaintiff only impacts ‘how the claims are processed.’ We hold that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to a rebuttal of the presumption of adequacy under the PSLRA.”

An ongoing issue in securities litigation is to what extent a short seller’s report can act as a corrective disclosure for purposes of establishing loss causation.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had the opportunity to address that issue for the first time last week.

In Defeo v. IonQ, Inc., 2025 WL 1035292 (4th Cir. April, 8, 2025), the plaintiffs alleged that a short seller report had revealed to investors that IonQ, which makes quantum computing systems, did not have a working product and its revenues were driven by phony related-party transactions.  The company responded to the report with a short press release deriding the report’s inaccuracies and then later issued a longer rebuttal.  The company’s stock price declined during this period.

The district court held that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not contain any reliable sources and therefore failed to adequately plead the elements of a federal securities claim.  In addressing a subsequent amended complaint, however, the district court found that the amendment was futile solely on the basis that the plaintiffs could not adequately plead loss causation.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit only addressed the issue of loss causation.  As to the short seller report, the court noted that while short seller reports could potentially act as corrective disclosures, in this instance the report “relies on anonymous sources for its nonpublic information and disclaims its accuracy.”  Indeed, as to the report’s use of sources, the publisher stated that some quotations “may be paraphrased, truncated, and/or summarized solely at our discretion, and do not always represent a precise transcript of those conversations.”  Under these circumstances, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the “potential evidentiary value [of the report] evaporates” and it could not form the basis for loss causation.

Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that the company’s initial response to the short seller report, which did not provide a point-by-point rebuttal, revealed to investors that the report was to some extent accurate.  The Fourth Circuit noted it could “envision a scenario where a third party exposes some unverified bombshell about a company and the company’s tacit mea culpa could function as a verification of that bombshell” but that this “theory holds no water here.”  The company’s press release generally rejected the report’s allegations.

Holding: Judgment of the district court finding amendment futile affirmed.

Quote of note: “The Report’s publisher admits some quotations ‘may be paraphrased, truncated, and/or summarized solely at our discretion, and do not always represent a precise transcript of those conversations.’ That disclosure is particularly troubling because it gives Scorpion Capital the kind of editorial license that could allow it to say just about anything and cloak it in the imprimatur of truth in order to make a buck. For example: If an expert represented, ‘IonQ’s 32-qubit system is revolutionary. By comparison, Company Y’s system looks prehistoric,’ Scorpion Capital gave itself the freedom to say, ‘IonQ’s 32-qubit system looks prehistoric,’ and attribute that quote to an expert. In all, those disclosures lead to the conclusion that ‘the character of the’ Report ‘rendered it inadequate’ to reveal any alleged truth to the market.”

In Kolominsky v. Root, Inc., 2024 WL 1854474 (6th Cir. April 29, 2024), the plaintiffs brought claims under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (securities fraud) and Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act (misstatements in registration statements and offerings) related to alleged misstatements about the company’s purportedly low customer-acquisition cost. The district court dismissed the claims based on the plaintiffs’ failure to adequately plead falsity. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit joined the majority of other circuits on two important issues related to Securities Act claims.

“Sounds in fraud” – Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims do not have fraud as an element, so generally they are not subject to the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). When plaintiffs bring both Section 10(b) and Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims in the same complaint, however, many courts have found that all of the claims “sound in fraud” and uniformly must be pled with particularity. In Kolominsky, the Sixth Circuit agreed that if the claims are “grounded in one fraudulent course of conduct relying on one set of facts” then Rule 9(b) applies.

“Bespeaks caution doctrine” – The bespeaks caution doctrine addresses situations where optimistic projections are coupled with cautionary language that impacts whether the statements are material or could reasonably have been relied upon by investors. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) has a safe harbor for forward-looking statements that applies to Securities Act claims, but there is an exclusion for statements made in connection with initial public offerings. In Kolominsky, the court held that the bespeaks caution doctrine has survived the codification of the PSLRA and joined its “sister circuits that hold when companies such as Root make forward-looking statements contained in a registration statement or in connection with an initial public offering, the Bespeaks Caution doctrine will shield those companies from liability when the forward-looking statements are accompanied by meaningful cautionary language so that a reasonable investor would understand the statements.”

Holding: Motion to dismiss affirmed.

The U.S. Supreme Court has issued a decision in Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. holding that the failure to disclose information required by Item 303 of Regulation S-K can support a Rule 10b-5(b) claim only if the omission renders affirmative statements misleading.  It is a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sotomayor.

Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires companies to describe “known trends or uncertainties” that may have a material impact on the company’s operations.  There has been a circuit split over whether a company’s failure to meet its Item 303 disclosure requirement can support a private claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) in the absence of an otherwise-misleading statement.  The Second Circuit has held that a private claim can be brought based on this omission, while other circuits – notably the Ninth Circuit and Third Circuit – have disagreed.

In Macquarie, the Court had little trouble concluding that the Second Circuit had gone too far in expanding the scope of potential securities fraud liability.  The Court clarified that “Rule 10b-5(b) does not proscribe pure omissions.”  Instead, it prohibits only affirmative misstatements and the omission of materials facts necessary to ensure that statements are not misleading (i.e., “half-truths”).  The failure to provide required information under Item 303 is not a half-truth, but instead is a pure omission of information.  Had Congress or the SEC wanted to make pure omissions a basis for liability under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the Court noted, they knew how to do so because that type of liability exists under Section 11 of the Securities Act for misstatements in registration statements.

Holding: Judgment vacated and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with opinion.

Quote of note:  “[T]he difference between an omission and a half-truth is the difference between a child not telling his parents he ate a whole cake and telling them he had dessert.  Rule 10b-5(b) does not proscribe pure omissions. . . . Put differently, it requires disclosure of information necessary to ensure that that statements already made are clear and complete (i.e., that the dessert was, in fact, a whole cake.)”

Disclosure:  The author of The 10b-5 Daily participated in an amicus brief in support of Macquarie filed by the Washington Legal Foundation.