What Is An Efficient Market?

The fraud-on-the-market theory states that reliance by investors on an alleged misrepresentation is presumed if the company’s shares were traded on an efficient market. What is an efficient market? Courts have frequently interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Basic v. Levinson (which adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory) as incorporating the economic definition of an “efficient market.” That is to say, an efficient market is one in which the stock price rapidly reflects all publicly available information. See, e.g., Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 367 (4th Cir. 2004).

At least one court, however, has taken a hard look at the Basic decision and disagrees. In In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 1977530 (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2004), the court found that an efficient market is simply one in which “‘market professionals generally consider most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.'” As a result, the court declined to consider the defendants’ argument (asserted as part of an opposition to class certification) that the fraud-on-the-market theory could not be applied because the market price of Polymedica stock did not fully and rapidly reflect public information.

Holding: Class certification granted (after excluding short sellers from the proposed class).

Quote of note: “When legal precedent is available, I follow it, not economic or academic literature. And though the First Circuit has not issued an opinion on the matter, Supreme Court precedent exists. Furthermore, it is plain in Basic that the Court did not want to adopt the ‘economic’ or ‘academic’ definition of efficient market.”

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In Search Of A Smoking Gun

A growing number of plaintiffs’ firms have forensic accountants on their permanent staff. An article (via law.com – free regist. req’d) in The Recorder discusses this trend and the importance of forensic accounting in formulating securities class action complaints that can survive a motion to dismiss.

Quote of note: “[Andy] Rudolph said the wave of corporate scandals led by Enron Corp. has cast his work in a new light. ‘I used to go to seminars and give speeches and almost get booed’ by other accountants and company CFOs, Rudolph said. ‘The pendulum has swung. Now people want to hear about fraud.’ He also gets a different reaction at social events when he tells people he’s a forensic accountant. ‘Is it like CSI?’ people ask.”

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Can You Bring A Securities Class Action Based On ’33 Act Claims In State Court?

The federal district court split over whether SLUSA bars the bringing of a securities class action alleging ’33 Act claims in state court continues. In Zia v. Medical Staffing Network, Inc., 2004 WL 2093505 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2004), the court held that SLUSA only permits the removal to federal court of securities class actions based on state law. Accordingly, the case was remanded. The decision notes, however, that the issue is currently before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in another case – ATC Enter., Inc. v. Williams – and oral argument was set to occur in September.

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Then Again, We Might Fire Them

Note to companies headquartered in Kansas: be careful when telling investors that you are eager to retain your senior officers.

In a securities class action against Sprint Corp., the plaintiffs based their claims on Sprint’s March 26, 2001 statement that it had entered into new employment contracts with its CEO and COO that were “designed to insure their long-term employment with Sprint.” According to the plaintiffs, this statement was misleading because Sprint knew that it might have to fire these officers as the result of a tax avoidance issue. In its motion to dismiss, Sprint argued that it had no duty to disclose this information because its statement did not “foreclose the possibility” that the CEO and COO might later be terminated.

The court disagreed with this characterization of the statement. See State of New Jersey and its Division of Investment v. Sprint Corp., 2004 WL 1960130 (D. Kan. Sept. 3, 2004). In finding that a duty to disclose existed, the court held that “Sprint’s statements that the contracts were ‘designed to insure’ the long-term employment of [the CEO and COO] could reasonably have led an investor to conclude that the termination of [their] employment (at least in the near future) was simply not an option from Sprint’s perspective.”

Although the court may have correctly found that a duty to disclose existed, the rationale it used is curious. Did Sprint really need to say, “then again, we might fire them,” for a reasonable investor to realize that it is always possible for the employment of a CEO or COO of a corporation to be terminated? Guess so.

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Court Appoints Trustee For Halliburton Plaintiffs

The Halliburton settlement just got even messier. Not only has the N.D. of Tex. rejected the proposed $6 million settlement, but the court now has appointed a trustee to protect the interests of the preliminary class members. The Houston Chronicle reports that Judge Lynn “made the decision to appoint the trustee, called a ‘guardian ad litem,’ Thursday, according to legal documents obtained Friday.”

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Fair Funds

Section 308 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the “Fair Funds” provision, allows the SEC to combine civil penalties with the disgorgement obtained from a securities law violator into a fund for the benefit of the victims of the violation. The Los Angeles Times has a feature article (free regist. req’d) today discussing the SEC’s use of its restitution powers. The article states that although accounts have been set up in 96 cases, amassing $2.6 billion in funds, the disbursement of those funds has proven to be a “logistical challenge” for the SEC and relatively little of the money has found its way to investors to date.

As for the impact on private litigation, the article notes that many of the supporters of the Fair Funds strategy “like the fact that the funds gave investors a means beyond class-action lawsuits to reclaim their losses.” In passing the legislation, however, Congress failed to specifically address whether these funds were supposed to supplement or offset funds obtained as the result of private litigation. The practical effect of large SEC civil penalties may be the reduction of private settlements, but it is not clear that they can be used as a direct offset.

The SEC, for its part, has not given defendants much comfort on this issue, suggesting that civil penalties should still be viewed as a punitive measure despite the Fair Funds provision. As the SEC’s Director of Enforcement stated earlier this year: “That harmed investors can benefit directly from these efforts is icing on the case, so to speak.” The courts may have to have the final say.

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Lehman To Settle Enron-Related Claims

The Wall Street Journal reports (subscrip. req’d) today that Lehman Brothers is “close to reaching a deal to pay about $220 million to settle a class-action lawsuit alleging that it and other big brokerage firms participated in a scheme with Enron Corp. executives to mislead shareholders.”

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Collective Scienter And The PSLRA

Whether a defendant corporation has acted with scienter (i.e., fraudulent intent) is determined by looking “to the state of mind of the individual corporate official or officials who make or issue the statement . . . rather than generally to the collective knowledge of all the corporation’s officers and employees acquired in the course of their employment.” Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2004). In other words, courts reject a “collective scienter” theory.

Eager to get at corporate wrongdoing, however, some courts have been ignoring this principle. In In re NUI Sec. Litig., 314 F.Supp.2d 388 (D.N.J. 2004), the court found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged a strong inference of scienter for the corporate defendant because NUI’s associate general counsel (who was not a defendant in the case and made none of the alleged misstatements) was alleged to have actual knowledge of the company’s fraudulent conduct. As to the individual defendants (the CEO and CFO of NUI), however, the court held that there were insufficient allegations concerning their motive to commit fraud and knowledge of the alleged fraudulent conduct.

Similarly, in the recent decision in In re Motorola Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 2032769 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2004), the court held that the plaintiffs had alleged a strong inference that Motorola “through its various officials, sought to mislead the investing public” about its vendor financing to a Turkish company. The direct fraud claims against the individual defendants (the CEO, CFO, and COO of Motorola) were dismissed, however, because the plaintiffs made no allegations that the individual defendants “had specific knowledge of the details concerning Motorola’s loan” and the plaintiffs’ motive allegations were insufficient.

In both cases, the claims against the individual defendants were not fully dismissed. Since the individual defendants controlled NUI and Motorola, and the courts found that a Rule 10b-5 claim was adequately pled against these companies, the Section 20(a) claims against the individual defendants based on control person liability for fraud still remained. By analyzing the scienter of NIU and Motorola separately, the courts, in essence, held that the companies acted with fraudulent intent, but their controlling officers or directors did not. This result both defies common sense (after all, a corporation can only act through its officers and directors) and, given that the individual defendants still have potential Section 20(a) liability, provides an end run around the PSLRA’s requirement that scienter be adequately plead as to each defendant.

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Mutual Fund Update

Two articles on the mutual fund trading practices cases, which have been consolidated in the D. of Md., suggest that they may not be a “bonanza” for investors.

The Wall Street Journal reports (subscrip. req’d) that “the hefty penalties already levied by regulators in settlements with 11 fund firms make it less likely there will be a big payoff for investors in the private litigation.” Meanwhile, the Boston Globe finds that the existing “settlement talks remain at initial stages” and some of the “fund firms appear to be in no mood to settle with plaintiffs.”

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Dura Briefs

The first set of briefs have been filed in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, the loss causation case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. Available on the web are Dura’s brief, along with amicus briefs from the Department of Justice and the SEC, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the Securities Industry Association and Bond Market Association, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and Technology Network. (The Washington Legal Foundation, Broadcom, and Merrill Lynch also filed amicus briefs and links will be posted when available.)

Dura and its supporters argue that, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, a plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between the alleged misrepresentations and a subsequent decline in the stock price to adequately plead and prove loss causation. Broudo’s time to respond has been extended until November 17.

Addition: The Merrill Lynch brief can be found here. (Thanks to Adam Savett for the link.)

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