Fee Objectors

Fee objectors are becoming a more common feature in securities class action settlements and, in some cases, are getting results. The Elan securities litigation was settled last year for $75 million. Plaintiffs requested that their counsel be awarded attorneys’ fees of 20% of the settlement or $15 million. There were fifteen objectors to the proposed award, with two of the objectors presenting substantive grounds for their opposition.

In its decision (In re Elan Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 911444 (S.D.N.Y. April 20, 2005)), the court reduced the fee award to 12% of the settlement or $9 million. Notably, the court agreed with the fee objectors that the plaintiffs faced only a modest risk of dismissal at the outset of the case and that the plaintiffs’ attempt to use the hours worked by non-lead counsel to justify the size of the fee award should be rejected.

Quote of note: “Virtually all of Unappointed Counsel’s hours fall into two categories: (1) ‘Investigation, Initial Pleadings, Consolidated Complaint,’ and (2) ‘PSLRA Notice, Lead Plaintiff Motion.’ But Unappointed Counsel failed to segregate the hours devoted to investigation and/or preparation of the Consolidated Complaint and do not establish why they should be compensated for, among other things, seeking but failing to be appointed lead counsel.”

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Confidential Sources

Confidential sources have become a hot topic in securities class actions. The Third Circuit and Ninth Circuit (see here and here) have issued recent decisions discussing the use of statements from confidential sources to help meet the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards. The New York Law Journal has an informative article (via law.com – free regist. req’d) that summarizes these decisions and talks generally about the development of the case law in this area.

Quote of note: “[A] majority of courts addressing this issue have permitted the use of confidential sources, at least under certain circumstances. However, a review of recent decisions suggests that the courts are now closely scrutinizing the use of confidential sources in securities fraud cases and are becoming more vigilant in probing whether there is in fact such a source, whether that source would have been in a position to acquire first-hand knowledge of the matters attributed to it, and whether the information attributed to the source is corroborated by other, independent particularized facts pled in the complaint.”

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What’s Reasonable To You . . .

Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the PSLRA provide that plaintiffs’ counsel in a securities class action may be awarded a “reasonable” fee as determined by the court. Courts generally agree that it is appropriate to cross-check a proposed percentage fee award using the lodestar method (take the reasonable hours expended times a reasonable hourly rate and enhance with a multiplier), but there is no uniformity as to what are the appropriate hours, rates, and multiplier to use.

In an interesting decision, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker of the N.D. of Cal. (who is no stranger to controversy on the subject of attorneys’ fees) attempts to establish a more rigorous method of assessing the reasonableness of a proposed fee. The court’s exhaustive lodestar analysis in In re HPL Technologies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 941586 (N.D. Cal. April 22, 2005) includes adjusting the value of the common stock portion of the settlement because of its illiquidity, lowering the hourly rates cited by the attorneys based on national standards, and creating hypothetical scenarios to establish a reasonable multiplier range. Although the court ultimately reduces the proposed percentage fee from 15% to 11% based on the lodestar crosscheck, it concedes that its “excursion has led it to take up legal issues that have not been briefed by counsel” and expressly grants leave for lead counsel to move for relief from the judgment. The 10b-5 Daily will keep an eye on further developments.

Quote of note: “The court can envision no defensible normative reason in this case–or indeed in common fund cases generally–that the amount of the fee ought to depend on the method used to compute it. Both methods should result in a ‘reasonable’ fee, and reasonableness cannot logically depend on whether the fee is expressed as a percentage of the recovery or the product of hours and rates.”

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Down Under

The use of securities class actions is gaining favor in other legal systems. In an interesting article entitled “The Rise of Shareholder Class Actions in Australia” (via mondaq.com – free regist. req’d), an Australian attorney discusses the legal, regulatory, and environmental changes that have led to a spate of recent cases against Australian companies. He also compares the U.S. and Australian systems.

Quote of note: “There is an ever popular view among regulators and academics that shareholder class actions should be encouraged in order to supplement the often slow-moving cogs of government enforcement with much speedier private actions. Private enforcement is frequently more intimidating to corporations, particularly in the case of shareholder class actions which can aggregate the claims of thousands or even millions of shareholder and thereby significant increase a corporation’s legal exposure in comparison with the relatively meagre statutory fines that attach to corporate misfeasance.”

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Lead Plaintiff Controls Attorneys’ Fees

In an interesting decision from earlier this month, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that deference should be given to a lead plaintiff’s decision not to compensate non-lead counsel. The case stems from the $3.2 billion settlement in the Cendant Corp. securities litigation. Lead counsel for the plaintiffs obtained $52 million in legal fees, which it shared with twelve other law firms that had been authorized to work on the case. An additional forty-five firms that represented individual plaintiffs, however, were frozen out of any fees. Three of these firms appealed the lower court’s rejection of their fee applications.

In In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 820592 (3rd Cir. April 11, 2005), the Third Circuit held that the PSLRA “significantly restricts the ability of plaintiffs’ attorneys to interpose themselves as representatives of a class and expect compensation for their work on behalf of that class.” As a result, the lead plaintiff’s “refusal to compensate non-lead counsel will generally be entitled to a presumption of correctness.” The court did find that non-lead counsel can ask the court to compensate them for work done before the appointment of a lead plaintiff, but they must “demonstrate that their work actually benefited the class.”

The Legal Intelligencer has an article (via law.com – free regist. req’d) on the decision.

Quote of note: “After the lead plaintiff is appointed, however, the PSLRA grants that lead plaintiff primary responsibility for selecting and supervising the attorneys who work on behalf of the class. We conclude that this mandate should be put into effect by granting a presumption of correctness to the lead plaintiff’s decision not to compensate non-lead counsel for work done after the appointment of the lead plaintiff. Non-lead counsel may refute the presumption of correctness only by showing that lead plaintiff violated its fiduciary duties by refusing compensation, or by clearly demonstrating that counsel reasonably performed work that independently increased the recovery of the class.”

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Arthur Andersen Settles WorldCom-Related Claims

Arthur Andersen LLP, the last remaining defendant in the WorldCom securities class action, has agreed to settle the case. The settlement ends the the ongoing trial in the S.D.N.Y. According to a New York Times article, the settlement is for $65 million plus “20 percent of any amount [Arthur Andersen] paid to distribute its remaining capital to its present and former partners.” The settlement also reportedly includes a “most favored nation clause” that guarantees the plaintiffs “the difference between the $65 million and any larger settlement in any other lawsuit [Arthur Andersen] may settle in the future.”

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Dura Roundup

More on the Dura decision:

(1) The Legal Times has an article (via law.com – free regist. req’d) discussing the reaction of the parties to the decision.

(2) Forbes has a column stating that the decision was a “no-brainer” and providing some academic commentary.

(3) The Wall Street Journal has an editorial (subscrip. req’d) citing the decision as another reason why criminal sentencing in the Enron “barge” case should not be based on the alleged inflation of the company’s stock price.

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Dura Decided

The U.S. Supreme Court has issued an opinion in the Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo case. It is a unanimous decision authored by Justice Breyer. As predicted, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s price inflation theory of loss causation. Instead, the court held that a plaintiff must prove that there was a causal connection between the alleged misrepresentations and the subsequent decline in the stock price.

Loss causation (i.e., a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss) is an element of a securities fraud claim. In the Dura case, the Ninth Circuit had held that to satisfy this element a plaintiff only need prove that “the price at the time of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation.” (See this post for a full summary of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.)

On appeal, the Supreme Court made three key findings in rejecting the price inflation theory of loss causation. First, the court dismissed the idea that price inflation is the equivalent of an economic loss. The court noted that “as a matter of pure logic, at the moment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant possesses equivalent value.” Moreover, it is not inevitable that an initially inflated purchase price will lead to a later loss. A subsequent resale of the stock at a lower price may result from “changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower price.”

Second, the court found that the price inflation theory of loss causation has no support in the common law. The common law has “long insisted” that a plaintiff in a deceit or misrepresentation action “show not only that if had he known the truth he would not have acted but also that he suffered actual economic loss.” Accordingly, it was “not surprising that other courts of appeals have rejected the Ninth Circuit’s ‘inflated purchase price’ approach.”

Finally, the court noted that the price inflation theory of loss causation was arguably at odds with the objectives of the securities statutes, including the PSLRA. The statutes make private securities fraud actions available “not to provide investors with broad insurance against market losses, but to protect them against those economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause.” In particular, the PSLRA “makes clear Congress’ intent to permit private securities fraud actions for recovery where, but only where, plaintiffs adequately allege and prove the traditional elements of causation and loss.”

As clear as the opinion is on the issue of the price inflation theory, it fails to provide much guidance on what a plaintiff must allege on loss causation to survive a motion to dismiss. The court assumed, without deciding, “that neither the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] nor the securities statutes impose any special further requirements in respect to the pleading of proximate causation or economic loss.” Even under the notice pleading requirements, however, the complaint’s bare allegation of price inflation was deemed insufficient. As stated by the court, “it should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss to provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.”

Holding: Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with opinion.

Addition: A few initial thoughts on the Dura opinion:

(1) The case is a significant victory for defendants in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which were the only two courts to adopt the price inflation theory of loss causation.

(2) Although the Supreme Court has put the price inflation theory to rest, its opinion raises some complicated questions about recoverable loss. For example, the Supreme Court notes that many factors other than misrepresentations can cause a stock price decline, but does not provide any guidance on how plaintiffs can meet their burden of proof for loss causation in cases where some or all of these other factors are present.

(3) The opinion is unclear on an issue that was raised on appeal: does the stock price decline need to be the result of a corrective disclosure that reveals the “truth” to the market? The Supreme Court makes some opaque references to when “the relevant truth begins to leak out” and “when the truth makes its way into the market place,” but does not squarely address whether there is any need for plaintiffs to establish the existence of a corrective disclosure.

(4) Finally, as noted above, the Supreme Court expressly leaves open the question of whether F.R.C.P. 9(b) or the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead loss causation with particularity. The lower courts will need to decide whether these statutes are applicable.

News reports on the Dura opinion can be found in the New York Times, the Washington Post , and Reuters.

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Dynegy Settles

Dynegy, Inc. (NYSE: DYN), a Houston-based energy provider, has announced the preliminary settlement of the securities class action pending against the company in the S.D. of Texas. The case, originally filed in 2002, alleges fraud related to the accounting treatment and disclosures associated with a structured natural gas transaction know as “Project Alpha.”

The settlement is for $468 million (including $150 million from the company’s insurers, a $250 million cash payment, and the issuance of $68 million in common stock). Dynegy also agreed to the election of two new directors to its Board of Directors from a list of candidates supplied by the lead plaintiff in the case.

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As Goes France . . .

The Associated Press reports that in France a government-appointed panel has begun preparing the new class action law. One early debate is over whether France should adopt an “opt-out” or “opt-in” system for potential class members.

Quote of note: “Eventually, experts say, the moves afoot in Britain, Sweden and France could lead to a European Union-wide class-action law – since governments generally prefer their neighbors’ industries to be exposed to the same kinds of risk as their own. ‘It’s not for tomorrow, but if it gets off the ground in France, and since we already have it in Sweden, then maybe we’ll see something at a European level,’ said Peter Burbidge, a law professor at Britain’s Westminster University. ‘The French would want others to have it if they have it.'”

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