The 5th Circuit and the Fraud on the Market Theory

Under the fraud on the market theory, reliance by investors on an alleged misrepresentation is presumed if the company’s shares were traded on an efficient market. The investors are not entitled to the presumption, however, if they are unable to show that the misrepresentation actually affected the market price of the stock.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion this week, Greenberg v. Crossroads Systems, Inc., No. 03-50311 (5th Cir. April 14, 2004), discussing the fraud on the market theory in a case where the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendants’ falsely positive statements had increased the company’s stock price. Under these circumstances, the determinations of reliance and loss causation essentially merged, with the court holding that the plaintiffs were only entitled to a presumption of reliance for the falsely positive statements that they could connect to the subsequent decline in the company’s stock price when the “truth” was revealed.

Holding: Affirming in part and vacating in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Quote of note: “We are satisfied that plaintiffs cannot trigger the presumption of reliance by simply offering evidence of any decrease in price following the release of negative information. Such evidence does not raise an inference that the stock’s price was actually affected by an earlier release of positive information. To raise an inference through a decline in stock price that an earlier false, positive statement actually affected a stock’s price, the plaintiffs must show that the false statement causing the increase was related to the statement causing the decrease. Without such a showing there is no basis for presuming reliance by the plaintiffs.”

Leave a comment

Filed under Appellate Monitor

No Damages? No Problem!

Here’s a good law school exam question — does a finding of liability under Rule 10b-5 in a private securities case require a reward of damages? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit submitted an essay answer today in the form of an opinion in Miller v. Asensio & Co., Inc., No. 03-1225 (4th Cir. April 14, 2004).

Asensio was a short seller that publicized negative statements about Chromatics Color Sciences Int., Inc. (“CCSI”), a company in which it had a significant short sell interest. Stockholders of CCSI sued Asensio alleging that the statements were material misrepresentations, “which Asensio initiated to defraud the market for its benefit, and which caused their CCSI stock to decline in value resulting in substantial losses to them.” After a trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Asensio liable, but awarding $0.00 in damages. On appeal, the stockholders argued that the finding of liability required the award of damages in some amount.

The Fourth Circuit disagreed (after noting that the issue was one of first impression). Courts “often refer to the fact of proximately caused damage and the amount of proximately caused damage as involving separate, although related, inquiries.” To establish Rule 10b-5 liability, a plaintiff only has to prove that the defendant’s misrepresentation was a “substantial cause of the loss” by showing a “direct or proximate relationship between the loss and the mispresentation.” Accordingly, a jury could find that “(1) the plaintiff proved the defendant’s fraud constituted a substantial cause of plaintiff’s loss and so find the defendant liable but (2) the plaintiff failed to provide a method to discern, by just and reasonable inference, the amount of plaintiff’s loss solely caused by defendant’s fraud, and so refuse to award the plaintiff any damages.”

Applying these principles to the case in hand, the Fourth Circuit found that “the evidence at trial provided the jurors with a sound basis on which to reach the result they did.”

Holding: Affirmed.

Quote of note: “In the vast majority of cases, a finding of the fact of proximately caused loss will result in the award of some amount of damages. However, it would seem contrary to Congress’ mandate that a plaintiff prove that the defendant ’caused the loss,’ 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(4), and that no plaintiff ‘shall recover . . . a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of,’ 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a), to direct a jury that it must award damages, even if faced, as here, with a record from which it cannot do so.”

Leave a comment

Filed under Appellate Monitor

Singing Machine Settles

The Singing Machine Co. (AMEX: SMD), a Florida-based maker of consumer-oriented karaoke machines, has announced the preliminary settlement of the securities class action (and a related derivative suit) pending against the company in the S.D. of Fla. The suit, originally filed in July 2003, is based on alleged misrepresentations related to Singing Machine’s restatement of its 2001 and 2002 financials.

The settlement is for a combination of 400,000 shares of common stock and a cash payment of $1.275 million ($800,000 from the company and $475,000 from its former auditor). Singing Machine also is obligated to make certain corporate governance changes, including expanding its board to six members with independent directors comprising at least 2/3 of the total board seats.

Leave a comment

Filed under Settlement

Simpson Thacher’s Settlement Decision

The New York Law Journal has an article (via law.com – NYLJ subscrip. req’d) on the tendency of law firms to settle litigation brought against them. The article discusses Simpson Thacher & Bartlett’s decision to pay $19.5 million as part of the Global Crossing securities class action settlement. Simpson Thacher was not a named defendant in the case, but had been accused of engaging in an incomplete investigation into certain accounting issues.

Quote of note: “A plaintiff’s lawyer who asked to remain unnamed because he is suing a different law firm in a separate class action said the charges against Simpson Thacher were ‘mushier’ than those brought against other firms in securities actions. It is not clear that Global Crossing’s drop in share price stemmed directly from Simpson’s alleged mishandling of the Olofson investigation, he explained. More typically, lawyers sued are those who helped prepare disclosure statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the investing public.”

Leave a comment

Filed under All The News That's Fit To Blog

The Fairy Tale May Be Over

The Copper Mountain securities litigation in the N.D. of Cal. is a font of notable decisions. As reported in The 10b-5 Daily, Judge Vaughn Walker issued a fairly amazing order in February expressing displeasure with both plaintiffs and the 9th Circuit over the lead plaintiff/lead counsel selection process in the case. After questioning whether the mandamus proceeding initiated by one of the lead plaintiff candidates was a “fairy tale” when the successful appellant decided not to pursue the position, the court ended up reappointing the original lead plaintiff.

With the lead plaintiff issue finally settled (after three years), the court was able to turn to the motion to dismiss. Last week, in In re Copper Mountain Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 725204 (N.D. Cal. March 30, 2004), the court granted the motion. The decision’s opening paragraphs present an interesting overview of the particularity requirement in fraud on the market cases (especially for defendants):

It is well-known that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and FRCP 9(b) impose a particularity requirement in the allegation of securities fraud. This is especially important in the case of a complaint alleging open market fraud or fraud on the market, such as the complaint at bar.
The starting point for the particularity analysis is not the allegedly false or misleading statements of the defendants, but the truth that emerges from the market. An open market trades on different points of view of an issuer’s prospects. If all investors thought the same things, there would be no trading except that prompted by the need of investors to re-balance their portfolios among investment alternatives (i.e., cash versus bonds, stocks versus cash, etc). What matters in an open market case is the total mix of information in the market and whether that mix has been altered in some significant way to create a very widely, indeed essentially universal, but wrong view of the value of the security at issue. It is the “truth” that reveals the “error” of the market. The disclosure of this “truth” avulsively changes the price of the security. But disclosure of a market “error” does not make out a case of “fraud on the market.” Starting with the “truth,” the complaint must allege facts to show that the previously settled but false investor expectations can be laid at the feet of defendants. This may seem simple, although it is not easy to do.

A complaint satisfying the particularity requirement does not require rococo factual detail, but it does require specifics. So a plaintiff seeking to allege open market securities fraud does well to begin the analysis with the “truth,” stack it up against what preceded it and then see if acts, omissions or statements of defendants can plausibly be said to be responsible for the “truth” not emerging earlier when plaintiffs traded their securities.
Generally, open market fraud complaints fail to satisfy the required pleading standard in one of several different ways. Most often plaintiffs cannot identify a false statement of defendant that might account for causing a security issue’s price to be distorted. Even if a statement that turns out to be false can be identified, it is usually so laden with cautionary language as to be unactionable as a practical matter. In the more common omissions case, plaintiff may be unable to find a ground upon which to allege that defendant knew the omitted fact or had a duty to disclose it. This complaint illustrates these various shortcomings.

Holding: Motion to dismiss granted (with limited leave to amend).

Leave a comment

Filed under Motion To Dismiss Monitor

Relating Back

As a general matter, allegations in an amended complaint relate back to the date of the original filing if they arise out of the same operative facts. What exactly constitutes the operative facts, of course, can be the subject of debate.

In In re American Express Co. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 632750 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2004), the court found that the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of their claims concerning Amex’s alleged misrepresentations about its investments in high-yield securities as of July 18, 2001. Although the original complaint was filed in a timely manner (i.e., within a year), the amended complaint was not filed until December 10, 2002, and contained new allegations about improper valuation methods, GAAP violations, and a lack of adequate risk controls. The court found that these allegations did not sufficiently relate back to the original complaint, even though they all generally concerned Amex’s investments in high-yield securities, and were therefore time-barred.

Holding: Motion to dismiss granted.

Quote of note: “The initial complaint simply avers that defendants did not disclose management’s failure to ‘fully comprehend’ the risks associated with Amex’s high-yield holdings. The Amended Complaint, on the other hand, claims that ‘the procedures for valuing and evaluating AEFA’s holdings made it impossible to monitor and guage risks accurately, and no such risk analysis was taking place.’ These allegations are therefore distinct from those in the intitial complaint, as they involve different ‘operative facts.'”

Thanks to Adam Savett for sending this case in.

Leave a comment

Filed under Motion To Dismiss Monitor

Bristol-Myers Dismissed

The Associated Press reports that the securities class action pending against Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (NYSE: BMY) in the S.D.N.Y. has been dismissed with prejudice. The case alleged that Bristol-Myers and certain of its officers had made misrepresentations concerning the company’s accounting practices and its investment in ImClone Systems.

Leave a comment

Filed under Motion To Dismiss Monitor

Lead Counsel Defends Actions in Terayon Case

The 10b-5 Daily has previously posted about the remarkable lead plaintiff/lead counsel order in the Terayon Communications securities class action pending in the N.D. of Cal.

In Judge Patel’s order, she removed Capital Partners and one of its employees as lead plaintiffs and wondered “whether counsel for plaintiffs actively participated in or provided advice to plaintiffs regarding their scheme to cause a fall in Terayon’s stock price.” The court found “it is probable that there is a conflict not only between lead plaintiffs and the class but also between lead counsel and the remainder of the class.” Lead counsel was asked to provide a written response to a number of questions and defendants were given leave to take further discovery on the issue.

The written response has been submitted in a March 24 filing by lead counsel. According to an article (via law.com – free regist. req’d) in The Recorder, lead counsel argued “that some of the contentions advanced by defendants are manifestly wrong, and led the court to express concern that this action might be the product of improper conduct, when in fact there was no improper conduct.” Lead counsel also provided the court with information about its communications with Cardinal and denied that it had extended the class period to hide Cardinal’s short position in Terayon’s stock.

Quote of note: “The firm also asked to have another hearing before Patel to further defend its actions in [the case]. Patel has yet to decide if she’ll schedule another hearing.”

Leave a comment

Filed under Lead Plaintiff/Lead Counsel

No Group Pleading

The “group pleading” doctrine creates the presumption that the senior officers of a company are collectively responsible for misrepresentations or omissions contained in public statements made by the company (e.g., press releases, SEC filings). District courts are divided over whether a plaintiff’s ability to plead in this manner has survived the enactment of the PSLRA with its heightened pleading standards for securities fraud.

Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made a strong statement against the use of group pleading. In Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 2004 WL 626721 (5th Cir. March 31, 2004), the court held that group pleading “cannot withstand the PSLRA’s specific requirement that the untrue statements be set forth with particularity as to ‘the defendant’ and that scienter be pleaded with regard to ‘each act or omission sufficient to give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.'” As a result of the PSLRA’s repeated references to “the defendant,” the court found that Congress intended plaintiffs to inform each defendant of his or her particular role in the alleged fraud.

Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed in part (the decision also contains an interesting, if relatively uncontroversial, discussion on determining scienter for a corporate defendant).

Quote of note: “[C]orporate officers may not be held responsible for unattributed corporate statements solely on the basis of their titles, even if their general day-to-day involvement in the corporation’s affairs is pleaded. However, corporate documents that have no stated author or statements within documents not attributed to any individual may be charged to one or more corporate officers provided specific factual allegations link the individual to the statement at issue.”

Leave a comment

Filed under Appellate Monitor

Mutual Fund Cases Get Started

In February, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transfered the mutual fund trading practices cases to the D. of Md. The Associated Press has an article on today’s opening hearing before the court, where the assigned judges dealt with scheduling issues.

Quote of note I: “[District Judge] Motz began by underscoring the importance of the case to investors nationwide. He warned the lawyers, which made up most of the 200 people inside the courtroom here, that the bulk of any money recovered would go to investors who lost money — not them. ‘No one should expect to get rich off of this case,’ Motz warned the lawyers.”

Quote of note II: “[District Judge] Blake set what she hoped would be a ‘reasonably fast schedule’ for the case. She gave attorneys two weeks to negotiate who will be the lead attorneys in the huge multidistrict case. If the attorneys can’t agree, the court will decide after a May 3 hearing.”

Leave a comment

Filed under All The News That's Fit To Blog