Simpson Thacher’s Settlement Decision

The New York Law Journal has an article (via law.com – NYLJ subscrip. req’d) on the tendency of law firms to settle litigation brought against them. The article discusses Simpson Thacher & Bartlett’s decision to pay $19.5 million as part of the Global Crossing securities class action settlement. Simpson Thacher was not a named defendant in the case, but had been accused of engaging in an incomplete investigation into certain accounting issues.

Quote of note: “A plaintiff’s lawyer who asked to remain unnamed because he is suing a different law firm in a separate class action said the charges against Simpson Thacher were ‘mushier’ than those brought against other firms in securities actions. It is not clear that Global Crossing’s drop in share price stemmed directly from Simpson’s alleged mishandling of the Olofson investigation, he explained. More typically, lawyers sued are those who helped prepare disclosure statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the investing public.”

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The Fairy Tale May Be Over

The Copper Mountain securities litigation in the N.D. of Cal. is a font of notable decisions. As reported in The 10b-5 Daily, Judge Vaughn Walker issued a fairly amazing order in February expressing displeasure with both plaintiffs and the 9th Circuit over the lead plaintiff/lead counsel selection process in the case. After questioning whether the mandamus proceeding initiated by one of the lead plaintiff candidates was a “fairy tale” when the successful appellant decided not to pursue the position, the court ended up reappointing the original lead plaintiff.

With the lead plaintiff issue finally settled (after three years), the court was able to turn to the motion to dismiss. Last week, in In re Copper Mountain Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 725204 (N.D. Cal. March 30, 2004), the court granted the motion. The decision’s opening paragraphs present an interesting overview of the particularity requirement in fraud on the market cases (especially for defendants):

It is well-known that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and FRCP 9(b) impose a particularity requirement in the allegation of securities fraud. This is especially important in the case of a complaint alleging open market fraud or fraud on the market, such as the complaint at bar.
The starting point for the particularity analysis is not the allegedly false or misleading statements of the defendants, but the truth that emerges from the market. An open market trades on different points of view of an issuer’s prospects. If all investors thought the same things, there would be no trading except that prompted by the need of investors to re-balance their portfolios among investment alternatives (i.e., cash versus bonds, stocks versus cash, etc). What matters in an open market case is the total mix of information in the market and whether that mix has been altered in some significant way to create a very widely, indeed essentially universal, but wrong view of the value of the security at issue. It is the “truth” that reveals the “error” of the market. The disclosure of this “truth” avulsively changes the price of the security. But disclosure of a market “error” does not make out a case of “fraud on the market.” Starting with the “truth,” the complaint must allege facts to show that the previously settled but false investor expectations can be laid at the feet of defendants. This may seem simple, although it is not easy to do.

A complaint satisfying the particularity requirement does not require rococo factual detail, but it does require specifics. So a plaintiff seeking to allege open market securities fraud does well to begin the analysis with the “truth,” stack it up against what preceded it and then see if acts, omissions or statements of defendants can plausibly be said to be responsible for the “truth” not emerging earlier when plaintiffs traded their securities.
Generally, open market fraud complaints fail to satisfy the required pleading standard in one of several different ways. Most often plaintiffs cannot identify a false statement of defendant that might account for causing a security issue’s price to be distorted. Even if a statement that turns out to be false can be identified, it is usually so laden with cautionary language as to be unactionable as a practical matter. In the more common omissions case, plaintiff may be unable to find a ground upon which to allege that defendant knew the omitted fact or had a duty to disclose it. This complaint illustrates these various shortcomings.

Holding: Motion to dismiss granted (with limited leave to amend).

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Relating Back

As a general matter, allegations in an amended complaint relate back to the date of the original filing if they arise out of the same operative facts. What exactly constitutes the operative facts, of course, can be the subject of debate.

In In re American Express Co. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 632750 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2004), the court found that the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of their claims concerning Amex’s alleged misrepresentations about its investments in high-yield securities as of July 18, 2001. Although the original complaint was filed in a timely manner (i.e., within a year), the amended complaint was not filed until December 10, 2002, and contained new allegations about improper valuation methods, GAAP violations, and a lack of adequate risk controls. The court found that these allegations did not sufficiently relate back to the original complaint, even though they all generally concerned Amex’s investments in high-yield securities, and were therefore time-barred.

Holding: Motion to dismiss granted.

Quote of note: “The initial complaint simply avers that defendants did not disclose management’s failure to ‘fully comprehend’ the risks associated with Amex’s high-yield holdings. The Amended Complaint, on the other hand, claims that ‘the procedures for valuing and evaluating AEFA’s holdings made it impossible to monitor and guage risks accurately, and no such risk analysis was taking place.’ These allegations are therefore distinct from those in the intitial complaint, as they involve different ‘operative facts.'”

Thanks to Adam Savett for sending this case in.

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Bristol-Myers Dismissed

The Associated Press reports that the securities class action pending against Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (NYSE: BMY) in the S.D.N.Y. has been dismissed with prejudice. The case alleged that Bristol-Myers and certain of its officers had made misrepresentations concerning the company’s accounting practices and its investment in ImClone Systems.

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Lead Counsel Defends Actions in Terayon Case

The 10b-5 Daily has previously posted about the remarkable lead plaintiff/lead counsel order in the Terayon Communications securities class action pending in the N.D. of Cal.

In Judge Patel’s order, she removed Capital Partners and one of its employees as lead plaintiffs and wondered “whether counsel for plaintiffs actively participated in or provided advice to plaintiffs regarding their scheme to cause a fall in Terayon’s stock price.” The court found “it is probable that there is a conflict not only between lead plaintiffs and the class but also between lead counsel and the remainder of the class.” Lead counsel was asked to provide a written response to a number of questions and defendants were given leave to take further discovery on the issue.

The written response has been submitted in a March 24 filing by lead counsel. According to an article (via law.com – free regist. req’d) in The Recorder, lead counsel argued “that some of the contentions advanced by defendants are manifestly wrong, and led the court to express concern that this action might be the product of improper conduct, when in fact there was no improper conduct.” Lead counsel also provided the court with information about its communications with Cardinal and denied that it had extended the class period to hide Cardinal’s short position in Terayon’s stock.

Quote of note: “The firm also asked to have another hearing before Patel to further defend its actions in [the case]. Patel has yet to decide if she’ll schedule another hearing.”

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No Group Pleading

The “group pleading” doctrine creates the presumption that the senior officers of a company are collectively responsible for misrepresentations or omissions contained in public statements made by the company (e.g., press releases, SEC filings). District courts are divided over whether a plaintiff’s ability to plead in this manner has survived the enactment of the PSLRA with its heightened pleading standards for securities fraud.

Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made a strong statement against the use of group pleading. In Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 2004 WL 626721 (5th Cir. March 31, 2004), the court held that group pleading “cannot withstand the PSLRA’s specific requirement that the untrue statements be set forth with particularity as to ‘the defendant’ and that scienter be pleaded with regard to ‘each act or omission sufficient to give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.'” As a result of the PSLRA’s repeated references to “the defendant,” the court found that Congress intended plaintiffs to inform each defendant of his or her particular role in the alleged fraud.

Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed in part (the decision also contains an interesting, if relatively uncontroversial, discussion on determining scienter for a corporate defendant).

Quote of note: “[C]orporate officers may not be held responsible for unattributed corporate statements solely on the basis of their titles, even if their general day-to-day involvement in the corporation’s affairs is pleaded. However, corporate documents that have no stated author or statements within documents not attributed to any individual may be charged to one or more corporate officers provided specific factual allegations link the individual to the statement at issue.”

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Mutual Fund Cases Get Started

In February, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transfered the mutual fund trading practices cases to the D. of Md. The Associated Press has an article on today’s opening hearing before the court, where the assigned judges dealt with scheduling issues.

Quote of note I: “[District Judge] Motz began by underscoring the importance of the case to investors nationwide. He warned the lawyers, which made up most of the 200 people inside the courtroom here, that the bulk of any money recovered would go to investors who lost money — not them. ‘No one should expect to get rich off of this case,’ Motz warned the lawyers.”

Quote of note II: “[District Judge] Blake set what she hoped would be a ‘reasonably fast schedule’ for the case. She gave attorneys two weeks to negotiate who will be the lead attorneys in the huge multidistrict case. If the attorneys can’t agree, the court will decide after a May 3 hearing.”

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Things Are Getting Interesting

The issue of loss causation is proving to be difficult for the S.D.N.Y. as it addresses the numerous research analyst cases. The general theme of the cases is straightforward: the defendants committed fraud by disseminating research reports that they knew to be overly optimistic. A key question, however, has been whether the subsequent decline in the company’s stock price was caused by the research reports.

In the Merrill Lynch decision, the court found that there was no alleged connection between the research reports and the companies’ financial troubles or the collapse of the overall market. In distinguishing that case, other S.D.N.Y. judges have pointed to additional facts linking the research reports to the alleged loss. In the Robertson Stephens decision, for example, the court noted that there was “evidence that disclosure of defendants’ scheme caused a further decline in the price of [the] stock, even after the overall bubble had burst.” While in the WorldCom decision, the plaintiffs had alleged that the analyst was aware of and concealed the accounting irregularities that led to the loss.

This week has seen the issuance of another research analyst decision from the S.D.N.Y., with what appears to be a new take on loss causation. In DeMarco v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., 2004 WL 602668 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2004), the plaintiffs allege that a Lehman analyst made buy recommendations for RealNetworks, Inc. stock during the class period (July 11, 2000 to July 18, 2001) while secretly holding negative views of the stock. In October 2000, the stock price declined, allegedly causing plaintiffs’ losses. Investors did not discover that the Lehman analyst had misled them about his opinion on RealNetworks until the release of certain e-mails by the SEC in April 2003.

On the issue of loss causation the court made the following holding:

“[A]ssuming arguendo that plaintiffs must plead that their losses proximately resulted from the marketplace’s reaction to the revelation of the truth that defendant’s actionable statements concealed (as contrasted to independent market forces), the Complaint adequately alleges that in or around October 2000, the market was finally apprised of the negative information concerning RealNetworks that had earlier led [the Lehman analyst] to take a secretly negative view of the stock and that, as a result of these revelations, the stock declined, causing the losses on which plaintiff here sues.”

The decision leaves a number of questions unanswered:

(1) Did the plaintiffs allege any facts demonstrating that the analyst knew about negative information that was not available to the market? (This factual scenario is suggested by the holding, but there is nothing in the decision to support it.)

(2) If the answer to Question 1 is no, what about the Merrill Lynch decision, which would appear to have reached the opposite conclusion on loss causation (but is not discussed by the court)?

(3) If the loss occurred in or around October 2000, how can the class period extend until July 18, 2001?

Things are getting interesting. Here’s a final question: what is the Second Circuit going to say about all of this and when?

Holding: Motion to dismiss denied.

Addition: As to when the Second Circuit is going to deal with the issue of loss causation and the research analyst cases, a good guess is as part of the Merrill Lynch appeal. The scheduling order for the appeal states that briefing will be completed on May 24, with argument to be heard as early as the week of July 12. Thanks to Adam Savett for passing along this information.

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Option To Sue?

The Wall Street Journal has an op-ed (subscrip. req.) in today’s edition by Craig Barrett, the CEO of Intel, arguing that the main beneficiary of a proposed Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) rule requiring companies to expense broad-based employee stock options will be the securities plaintiffs’ bar. The problem is that there is no “model that can value options with any degree of accuracy.” Companies will therefore have to make choices about how to value their options that can have a substantial impact on reported earnings. “The result,” Barrett concludes, “may be a field day for trial lawyers and class action lawsuits.”

Quote of note: “Two Columbia University economists, Charles Calomiris and Glenn Hubbard (who served as chairman of President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors from 2001 to 2003), have extensively documented the uncertainty surrounding attempts to quantify options expenses. The Black-Scholes model and its cousin, the binomial method, can be wildly inaccurate. FASB knows this and is, therefore, unlikely to require any single means of calculation. It’s all up to corporate financial officers and their auditors, none of whom have a reliable method to account for options. It’s the blind leading the blind leading the blind.”

Addition: FASB has issued an “Exposure Draft” and background materials for their proposed new standards for expensing options.

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SkillSoft Settles (Again)

As reported in The 10b-5 Daily, last December SkillSoft PLC (Nasdaq: SKIL) settled a securities class action brought against the company in the N.D. of Cal. for $32 million. But that still left another, more recent securities class action based on alleged misrepresentations relating to a 2002 financial restatement pending in the D. of N.H.

Yesterday, the New Hampshire-based business and IT training software maker announced the preliminary settlement of the D. of N.H. case for $30.5 million. SkillSoft stated that it is in discussions with its insurers over their potential contribution to the settlement amount.

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