Category Archives: Lead Plaintiff/Lead Counsel

What Effect Will FRCP 23(g) Have On The Appointment Of Lead Counsel?

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Class Actions”) recently was amended to require a court to consider certain factors in appointing class counsel, including the “work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims” and its overall expertise. As part of this process, the court can direct potential class counsel “to propose terms for attorney fees and nontaxable costs.” If there is more than one adequate applicant for class counsel, the court must appoint “the applicant best able to represent the interests of the class.” See FRCP 23(g).

Under the PLSRA, the lead plaintiff generally must satisfy “the requirements of Rule 23.” The statute also states, however, that the lead plaintiff “shall, subject to approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.” Many courts have interpreted this provision as granting them relatively little discretion over the appointment of lead counsel. Is that still true following the implementation of the Rule 23 amendments?

To date, only two courts have discussed the interaction between new Rule 23(g) and the PSLRA. In In re Cree, Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 369 (M.D.N.C. 2003),* the court noted that it had an “obligation to assure that lead plaintiff’s choice of representation best suits the need of the class” and it was “guided in the exercise of its discretion by the provisions of the new Rule 23(g).” The court previously had requested that the potential lead counsel submit information concerning its experience, resources, and proposed fees. After reviewing this information, the court found that it was satisfied with the proposed lead counsel, but warned that it “will take its obligation seriously to see that any fees sought by counsel are just and reasonable under the circumstances.”

In In re Copper Mountain Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 369859 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2004), the court addressed the 9th Circuit’s decision in In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2002) on remand. In reversing the lower court’s earlier lead plaintiff/lead counsel decision, the Cavanugh panel had held that information about fee arrangements “is relevant only to determine whether the presumptive lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel is so irrational, or so tainted by self-dealing or conflict of interest, as to cast genuine or serious doubt on that plaintiff’s willingness or ability to perform the functions of lead plaintiff.” After stating that “Cavanaugh would seem to establish that the largest stakeholder’s selection of counsel must be approved unless that selection is either mad or crooked,” the lower court noted that “the continuing vitality of the Cavanaugh test may be questioned in light of recent amendments to FRCP 23.”

It seems likely that these cases are the tip of the iceberg on this issue. Stay tuned.

*Disclosure: The author of The 10b-5 Daily represents the defendants in the Cree securities litigation.

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This Is No Fairy Tale

Close on the heels of the Copper Mountain decision (the “fairy tale” case) comes another remarkable lead plaintiff/lead counsel order. In the Terayon securities class action, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel of the N.D. of Cal. has both disqualified two of the lead plaintiffs and found it “probable” that lead counsel must also be removed.

Terayon Communication Systems, Inc. is a Santa Clara-based maker of cable modem equipment. The securities class action against the company, initially filed in April 2000, is based on allegedly misleading statements concerning the company’s ability to obtain certification for its technology.

Judge Patel originally appointed Cardinal Investment Co. and Marshall Payne (an employee of Cardinal) as two of the lead plaintiffs in the case. It came out in discovery, however, that Cardinal and Payne were significant short sellers of Terayon stock (hundreds of thousands of shares) and in early 2000 had begun a campaign to flood the market with negative information about the company. The campaign included phone calls to the certification entity, starting Internet chat room rumors, letters to the SEC, and contacts with financial reporters.

Moreover, Cardinal was apparently working closely with plaintiffs’ counsel (later lead counsel for the class) during this period. Starting in February 2000, Internet website postings encouraged parties to contact plaintiffs’ counsel about a proposed lawsuit against Terayon. According to Judge Patel, “the class period in the original complaint, i.e. the first day on which plaintiffs claim they were damaged, was February 9, 2000 the same day these Internet postings appeared. Defendants assert that these web postings were part of plaintiffs’ alleged scheme to drive the price of the stock down.”

On April 11, 2000, the same day as a Terayon earnings conference call during which the company’s executives were sharply criticized by short sellers using phony names, an investor plaintiff signed a sworn statement authorizing the filing of a complaint that closely tracked the language of Cardinal’s letters to the SEC. It was not until the next day, however, that the price of Terayon’s stock dropped significantly. The complaint was filed on April 13.

Following the revelation of these facts, defendants moved to have Cardinal and Payne removed as lead plaintiffs. Judge Patel has agreed and more.

The court found “[w]hile some short sales may not, in and of themselves render a lead plaintiff’s claims atypical, a pattern of affirmatively engaging in campaigns devised to lower the price of the stock in question certainly contains within it the seeds of discord between lead plaintiffs and the remaining plaintiffs.” Accordingly, the court removed Cardinal and Payne as lead plaintiffs (and also noted that they “appear to have participated, if not perpetrated, a fraud of their own on the market” and could be subject to claims by their fellow shareholders).

As for lead counsel, the court expressed concern over lead counsel’s pre-suit involvement with Cardinal and its apparent efforts “to mislead the court as to the scope and nature of lead plaintiffs’ holdings in Terayon stock” as part of the lead plaintiff selection process. Based on this course of events, the court wondered “whether counsel for plaintiffs actively participated in or provided advice to plaintiffs regarding their scheme to cause a fall in Terayon’s stock price” and invited a motion on whether lead counsel had waived privilege. In any event, the court found “it is probable that there is a conflict not only between lead plaintiffs and the class but also between lead counsel and the remainder of the class.” Lead counsel was asked to provide a written response to a number of questions and defendants were given leave to take further discovery on the issue.

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Fairy Tales, Lead Plaintiffs, And The PSLRA

If the judge ain’t happy, ain’t nobody happy. Proving that axiom correct, Judge Vaughn Walker of the N.D. of Cal. issued a fairly amazing order last week in the Copper Mountain securities litigation, expressing displeasure with both plaintiffs and the 9th Circuit over the lead plaintiff/lead counsel selection process in that case.

The PSLRA provides that the “presumptively most adequate lead plaintiff” in a securities class action is the movant who “has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class” and “otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” To summarize the process, the judge’s task is to determine which plaintiff has the largest financial interest, evaluate whether that plaintiff meets the adequacy and typicality tests of Rule 23(a), and, if that plaintiff meets the requirements, declare that plaintiff the presumptive lead plaintiff (a presumption that may then be rebutted by other plaintiffs). The court must also approve the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel.

Three years ago, Judge Walker determined that he would not name the lead plaintiff movant in the Copper Mountain case with the largest financial interest as lead plaintiff because that candidate, known as the CMI Group, failed to demonstrate that it was an adequate lead plaintiff. Judge Walker based his decision on the CMI Group’s failure to negotiate a “competitive” fee arrangement with proposed lead counsel and named a different movant as lead plaintiff. See In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475 (N.D. Cal. 2001) and In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

The CMI Group petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus. In In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2002), the court overruled Judge Walker’s decision. The panel, in an opinion written by Judge Alex Kozinski, found that the lower court had failed to follow the statutory language of the PSLRA in appointing the lead plaintiff. In particular, the court found that “a straightforward application of the statutory scheme . . . provides no occasion for comparing plaintiffs with each other on any basis other than their financial stake in the case.” Moreover, the lead plaintiff process “is not a beauty contest” and information about fee arrangements “is relevant only to determine whether the presumptive lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel is so irrational, or so tainted by self-dealing or conflict of interest, as to cast genuine or serious doubt on that plaintiff’s willingness or ability to perform the functions of lead plaintiff.” Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court’s order and instructed the lower court to proceed with the CMI Group as the presumptive lead plaintiff.

On remand, however, the CMI Group apparently decided to no longer seek lead plaintiff status (or, as Judge Walker puts it, “vanished – fled the scene – gone south – maybe vaporized”). In his order, Judge Walker compares the situation to a “heroic prince” turning into a “frog” and is incredulous over the course of events:

“By vindicating their ‘right’ to be the presumptive lead plaintiffs through the extraordinary remedy of mandamus (and establishing circuit precedent of no little value to their lawyers), the CMI group might seem to possess a tenacity and determination seldom seen on the battlegrounds of federal litigation. But what might seem apparently is not. Could there have been some motivation other than vindicating the interests of defrauded investors behind the mandamus proceedings? Could it be that the Ninth Circuit panel, perceiving the black letter of the PSLRA, was actually reading a fairy tale?”

Also not surprisingly, Judge Walker appears to believe that the CMI Group’s decision vindicates his earlier order. Noting that “Cavanaugh would seem to establish that the largest stakeholder’s selection of counsel must be approved unless that selection is either mad or crooked,” the court finds that the opinion converts the PSLRA into “a straightjacket against judicial measures to ensure that [securities class actions] genuinely benefit investors, not lawyers.” In the absence of the CMI Group, Judge Walker ends up simply reappointing the earlier lead plaintiff to the position. “The moral of the story,” the court concludes, “will be left to you, dear readers.”

The Recorder has an article (via law.com – free regist. req’d) on the case in today’s edition. Judge Walker’s order is not yet available online.

Addition: The opinion is now on Westlaw – In re Copper Mountain Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 369859 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2004).

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The Public Pension Fund Factor

PricewaterhouseCoopers has released a study on the role of public pension funds in securities class actions. Notable results:

(1) The number of cases with public pension funds as lead plaintiff has steadily increased since the passage of the PSLRA in 1995 – from 4 cases filed in 1996 to 56 cases filed in 2002.

(2) Of the more than 100 active cases where a public pension fund is acting as lead plaintiff, 80% allege accounting issues.

(3) In 2003, 15 settlements averaging over $120 million were reached in cases where a public pension fund served as lead plaintiff — sixteen times the average value of the remaining 85 cases settled last year.

There are a lot of conclusions that could be drawn from this data, but it is certainly clear that public pension funds are taking the lead in large accounting fraud cases.

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NYLJ Article On Solicitation Dispute

The New York Law Journal has an article (via law.com – free registration req.) on Judge Cote’s opinion &order in the WorldCom solicitation dispute. (The 10b-5 Daily has previously posted about the court’s decision and the underlying dispute.)

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Court Rules On Solicitation Dispute In WorldCom Case

As previously reported in The 10b-5 Daily, Milberg Weiss and Bernstein Litowitz are in the midst of a dispute over the recruitment of individual bondholders to bring securities fraud claims against WorldCom and related parties. Bernstein Litowitz, who represents the lead plaintiff in the main investor action against WorldCom, has complained in a series of submissions to the court that Milberg Weiss provided “misleading solicitations” to WorldCom bondholders suggesting that they would not obtain a fair share of any settlement obtained in the main investor action and should bring their own individual actions.
Yesterday, District Judge Cote issued an opinion & order concerning this matter. The court found that Milberg Weiss has engaged in an “active campaign” to encourage pension funds to file individual actions and is running the individual actions as “a de facto class action.” Moreover, the firm’s communications have resulted in “some confusion and misunderstanding of the options available to putative class members.”
The court ordered that a separate notice (in addition to the normal class certification notice) be sent to each plaintiff who has filed an individual action, with the initial draft to be written by Bernstein Litowitz. The requests for relief made by Bernstein Litowitz in its November 4 submission to the court were denied, but leave was granted for the firm to bring a formal motion on the subject.

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Short Sellers Drive Down Stock Price, Then Sue Based On Loss In Hedge Position

The San Franciso Chronicle has a fascinating article on the Terayon Communication Systems, Inc. (Nasdaq: TERN) securities class action pending in the N.D. of Cal. Terayon is a Santa Clara-based maker of cable modem equipment. The case, originally filed in April 2000, is based on allegedly misleading statements made by the company in connection with its ability to obtain certification for its technology.
The lead plaintiff (or one of them) in the case is Cardinal Investment Co. According to the article, court records reveal that Cardinal was a massive short seller of Terayon stock (hundreds of thousands of shares) and in early 2000 began a campaign to flood the market with negative information about the company. The campaign included phone calls to the certification entity, starting Internet chat room rumours, letters to the SEC, and contacts with financial reporters. At the same time, Cardinal apparently hedged its short position by purchasing 6000 shares of Terayon stock.
On April 11, 2000, the same day as a Terayon earnings conference call during which the company’s executives were sharply criticized by short sellers using phony names, an investor plaintiff signed a sworn statement authorizing the filing of a complaint that “repeated almost verbatim the accusations contained in Cardinal’s letters to the SEC.” It was not until the next day, however, that the price of Terayon’s stock dropped significantly. The highly detailed complaint was filed on April 13. Cardinal also brought a suit and later successfully moved to act as a lead plaintiff in the case based on the losses in its hedge position.
The motion to dismiss in the case was denied by District Judge Patel in early 2002. Discovery, however, has apparently revealed Cardinal’s role in the company’s downfall. Terayon has asked Judge Patel to remove Cardinal as a lead plaintiff.
Quote of note: “On Sept. 8, during a hearing on Terayon’s request, Patel sounded receptive to the company’s arguments, noting that Cardinal’s partners ‘were doing just about everything they could to make sure the (stock) price went down.’ But her sharpest comments concerned the puzzling events that led to Cardinal’s lawsuit. ‘I think it’s utterly amazing,’ she told the opposing attorneys, ‘that we have this lengthy complaint, and with all of these excruciating details, and the stock just drops the day before.’ It ‘raises some very serious questions.'”

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Dispute Between Plaintiffs’ Firms Goes Public

Two prominent plaintiffs’ firms, Milberg Weiss and Bernstein Litowitz, are in the midst of a dispute over the recruitment of individual bondholders to bring securities fraud claims against WorldCom and related parties. Bernstein Litowitz represents the lead plaintiff in the main investor action against WorldCom, which has been brought on behalf of both common shareholders and bondholders in the S.D.N.Y.
In an October 29 letter to the court, Bernstein Litowitz complains that Milberg Weiss provided “misleading solicitations” to WorldCom bondholders suggesting that they would not obtain a fair share of any settlement obtained in the main investor action and should bring their own individual actions. According to a Reuters article, Milberg Weiss “strongly denied the accusations, which will be aired at a hearing [today] in New York before U.S. District Judge Denise Cote.” (As posted in The 10b-5 Daily, class certification was recently granted in the WorldCom case.)

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Let The Mudslinging Begin

Under the PSLRA, the lead plaintiff in a securities class action is presumptively the party with the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class. The presumption may be rebutted, however, by a showing that this party will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class or is subject to unique defenses not applicable to other class members. Not only does the lead plaintiff get to run the case, it also has virtually free reign to appoint its attorney as lead counsel for the class. Given that the lead counsel can obtain significant fees from a successful securities class action, the battle over the lead plaintiff position is often intense.

The State of New Jersey has been an active participant in securities class actions over the past few years, often applying for the lead plaintiff role. (The 10b-5 Daily previously posted about this development.) In In re Motorola Securities Litigation, 2003 WL 21673928 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2003), New Jersey was far and away the lead plaintiff candidate with the most alleged losses. Its candidacy came under fierce attack, however, from another group of investors, led by Commerzbank, who were also seeking the lead plaintiff position.

First, Commerzbank argued that New Jersey would be subject to a unique defense because state officials have publicly criticized the state’s Department of Investment, blaming it for the relevant losses. The court rejected this argument, noting that “if New Jersey’s investment strategy during the early part of the decade was less than ideal, this actually may make the State more typical of those who have lost money in the stock market rather than less.”

Second, Commerzbank argued that newspaper reports in New Jersey suggested the existence of a “pay-to-play” scheme, in which Governor McGreevey would consider hiring law firms to represent the state in securities litigation if they made political contributions. The newspaper article in question, however, made no mention of the Motorola litigation or the two firms representing the state in the case (who both submitted declarations denying they had been awarded the representation in return for political contributions).

Holding: New Jersey appointed lead plaintiff.

The decision can be found here by putting in the case number (No. 03 CV 287).

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“Biggest Hog At The Trough”

The Bristol Herald Courier has an article today on the lead plaintiff contest in the King Pharmaceuticals securities class action in the E.D. of Tenn. (Thanks to the SW Virginia Law Blog for the link.) The case is based on allegedly misleading financial statements made by the company.

At least two groups of pensions funds, as well as some individual investors who were shareholders in a company King Pharmaceuticals acquired, have moved for lead plaintiff status. U.S. Magistrate Judge Dennis Inman presided over the hearing.

Quote of note: “Inman said federal law favors the appointment of the stockholder who lost the most money. ‘I’d like to know who is the biggest hog at the trough,’ Inman said. That question prompted a lively debate among the dozen-plus lawyers, all of whom had a reason that their client should get the nod.”

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