Monthly Archives: June 2003

The Perfect Storm

The opinion in the Interpublic Group case (In re Interpublic Securities Litigation, 2003 WL 21250682, (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2003)) is a must-read because it brings three strands of questionable law together to eviscerate the PSLRA’s scienter (i.e., fraudulent intent) pleading requirement. It has taken The 10b-5 Daily a while to get around to addressing the opinion, but only because there is so much to say!
A little background is in order. Interpublic (“IPG”) is a New York holding company that ranks as the second-largest owner of advertising agencies in the world. The case is the result of a restatement IPG announced last August for the five years from 1997 to 2001, which corrected inter-company charges that had been wrongly declared as income for the European offices of one of IPG’s agencies.
The three strands of questionable law are:
1) Section 20(a) liability has no scienter elementSection 20(a) of the ’34 Act creates a cause of action against defendants alleged to have been “control persons” of those who engaged in securities fraud. Good faith may be asserted as an affirmative defense. Six circuit courts have held that plaintiffs do not have to show that the control persons acted with scienter (the 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits); two have held that such a showing is required (the 3rd and 4th Circuits). The Second Circuit has not definitively answered the question, but has stated that to prove a Section 20(a) claim a plaintiff must show, inter alia, “that the controlling person was in some meaningful sense a culpable participant.” Although some district courts in the Second Circuit have found that this creates a scienter pleading requirement, others have disagreed. The effect of no scienter requirement, however, is that the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA do not apply. All plaintiffs need to show at the pleading stage is: (a) there was a primary violation by a controlled person; and (b) control of the primary violator by the defendant.
2) Corporate acquisitions for stock can be a motive for securities fraud – There is a line of cases, especially in the Second Circuit, which hold that a desire to acquire other companies through the use of stock as consideration may be a sufficient allegation that defendants had a motive to make misstatements for the purpose of artificially inflating the stock price. (Note that the question of whether the motive and opportunity to commit fraud is sufficient, on its own, to establish scienter for a Rule 10b-5 claim is a whole separate debate. The Second Circuit has held that it is, but other circuit courts have disagreed.) The relatively unexplored question is: motive for whom? The company may benefit from obtaining another entity at a cheap price, but the “concrete benefit” for the individual defendants (i.e., officers or directors) is in the value of their stock. So in the absence of stock sales by the individual defendants at an inflated price (with the acquisition presumably included), are corporate acquisitions really a motive for individual defendants to commit fraud?
3) Personifying the company – It is generally understood that a company acts through its officers and directors. As a result, courts uniformly hold that allegations of scienter as to the individual defendants in a securities fraud case can be used to plead a claim against the company. In other words, the scienter of the individual defendants is imputed to the company. But is the reverse true? Can a securities fraud case continue against a company if there are insufficient allegations of scienter as to the individual defendants? For some courts, the corporate acquisitions motive appears to be the answer to this question. In In re IPO Securities Litigation, 241 F.Supp.2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), for example, the court separately examined the motive allegations against the companies and the individual defendants that had been sued. For the companies, the court considered whether there had been stock-based acquisitions or add-on offerings during the class period. For the individual defendants, the court looked at stock sales during the class period. In other words, the motive of a company to commit fraud was evaluated without reference to the motive of the company’s officers or directors.
All of which leads to the holdings in the IPG opinion, the perfect storm that happens when these three strands of questionable law come together. As to the Rule 10b-5 claims in the case, the court made the following rulings: (a) the series of stock-for-stock acquisitions made by IPG during the class period created a strong inference that IPG had acted with scienter; and (b) there were insufficient allegations concerning the individual defendants’ stock sales and knowledge of the accounting problems to create a strong inference that the individual defendants had acted with scienter. As a result, the Rule 10b-5 claims were allowed to continue against IPG, but were dismissed against the individual defendants.
The individual defendants were not, however, free to go. Since they controlled IPG and the court had found that a Rule 10b-5 claim was adequately pled against IPG, the Section 20(a) claims for controlling person liability against the individual defendants still remain.
This is a troubling result on two levels. By analyzing the scienter of IPG separately, the court, in essence, ends up holding that IPG acted with fraudulent intent, but its officers and directors did not. How can a company do anything if not through its officers and directors? Moreover, the PSLRA was designed to protect individuals from unsubstantiated securities fraud claims. By applying Section 20(a) in this manner, the court allowed the plaintiffs to bypass the heightened pleading requirements for scienter in the PSLRA. Based on the IPG holding, plaintiffs merely have to establish that the company had a motive for fraud (or, one supposes, that some unnamed person at the company knew of the misstatements or was reckless with respect to them), and can then continue to bring their securities fraud claims against both the company and its officers and directors (in the form of Section 20(a) claims) without having to make any specific scienter allegations concerning the individual defendants. That does not comport with the PSLRA’s requirement that scienter be sufficiently alleged as to each defendant.
This post covers a lot of ground. Readers comments, as always, are welcome.

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Scandals Are Expensive

The Associated Press has an article discussing the financial costs associated with the problems at Rite-Aid Corp. The 10b-5 Daily has previously posted about the related securities class action here. Interestingly, both plaintiffs’ counsel and an independent expert appear to agree that it is very difficult to determine the actual damages suffered by Rite-Aid’s shareholders as a result of the alleged fraud.

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More Accounting Problems At Tyco

The Wall Street Journal (subscription required) reports today that Tyco International Ltd. will “restate its financial results back to 1998 to correct $696.1 million that it mistakenly classified as pretax charges in recent quarters.” It is the fifth time in seven months that Tyco has announced accounting problems. The restatement will not change the overall financial results for the Company during the period in question.

Tyco is a defendant in a securities class action in the D. of N.H.

Quote of note: “The restatements also complicate Tyco’s legal situation in shareholder lawsuits it is facing over scandals that have battered its share price. Once companies restate, plaintiffs no longer have to prove past financial statements were wrong.”

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Using ERISA To Avoid The PSLRA

It is axiomatic that bad facts make for bad law. One area of the law that is changing rapidly in response to the recent corporate scandals is Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) litigation. ERISA creates a right of action against company executives overseeing employee stock ownership plans who violate their fiduciary duties to the plan participants.

The recent trend, however, is for employees who lost retirement savings as a result of their investment in company stock to file an ERISA class action against the company that parallels the pending securities class action on behalf of all investors. In other words, the employees allege the company and its officers violated their fiduciary duties under ERISA by making false statements that induced employees to invest in the stock at artificially inflated prices. These parallel ERISA class actions have been filed, for example, against Enron, Qwest, WorldCom, and Global Crossing.

ERISA class actions based on false statements to the market are problematic for two reasons. First, the suits attempt to significantly expand the scope of ERISA liability to include officers not responsible for the management of plan assets and statements that are not related to plan benefits. David Gische and Jo Ann Abramson of Ross, Dixon & Bell have an excellent overview of these issues in an article entitled “Corporate Fiduciary Liability Claims in the Post-Enron Era” that was written last year. (Thanks to the Securities Law Beacon for the link.) Second, the suits allow plaintiffs to make an end run around the procedural safeguards of the PSLRA. Because they are brought under ERISA, rather than the federal securities laws, plaintiffs can obtain early discovery and seek to force a quick settlement. An article in Monday’s edition of The Recorder discusses the growth of these suits and their overlap with securities class actions.

Quote of note (The Recorder): “One of the reasons companies don’t always mount the most aggressive defense to ERISA suits is that any settlement comes from a fiduciary liability insurance fund — separate from insurance for securities litigation — that’s often untapped. Consequently, the mainstream securities fraud bar usually has no problem with the ERISA suits.”

Quote of note II (The Recorder): “Courts are still working out the limits of fiduciary duties in these cases . . . For example, what if an executive has inside information that the company’s financial picture isn’t as good as touted? As fiduciaries, shouldn’t they divest employee stock? Sure. But wouldn’t that be insider trading?”

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4th Circuit Upholds Dismissal of Duratek Case

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has upheld the dismissal of a securities class action against Duratek, Inc., a Columbia, Md.-based company that disposes of radioactive waste materials for nuclear facililties. The opinion can be found here.

Any securities litigation opinion from the Fourth Circuit has the potential to be big news, because the court has never decided whether recklessness suffices to meet the scienter requirement for 10b-5 actions and, correspondingly, what a plaintiff must plead to satisfy the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards for scienter. But no luck today. Duratek is a per curiam opinion and simply holds that “even under the lenient Second Circuit standard” the complaint failed to adequately plead scienter.

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The Enron Watch III

According to an article in the Houston Chronicle, the federal judges overseeing Enron’s bankruptcy and securities class action suits have appointed a new mediator for the settlement negotiations. The judges previously gave the job to U.S. District Judge Kevin Duffy of the S.D.N.Y. Judge Duffy’s name was withdrawn, at his request, a week later. They did not go far to find Judge Duffy’s replacement — the new mediator will be Senior U.S. District Judge William Conner, also of the S.D.N.Y.

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The Big Breakup Keeps Getting Press

The Los Angeles Daily Journal has an article on the Milberg Weiss split, including further speculation on the causes. (Thanks to Corp Law Blog for the link.)

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Monday Morning Settling

Nanonphase Technologies Corp. (Nasdaq: NANX) and Cutter & Buck Inc. (Nasdaq: CBUK) have agreed to settle the securities class actions pending against them.

Nanophase will pay $2.5 million to settle claims arising from the Company’s public disclosures in 2001 regarding its dealings with Celox, a British customer.

Cutter & Buck will pay $4 million in cash, plus an additional $3 million based on a formula applied to any recovery of funds from its ongoing suit against its D&O insurer (who has evidently sought to rescind its policy). The settlement also covers a separate derivative suit and includes the implementation of certain corporate governance policies.

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The Martha Stewart Watch III

Well, it’s not exactly about Martha Stewart, but it’s related. Judge Owen of the S.D.N.Y. apparently has denied the motions to dismiss in the two securities class actions against ImClone Systems, Inc. (Nasdaq: IMCLE).

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WP Supports Class Action Reform

Over the weekend, the Washington Post editorial page came out in favor of the Class Action Fairness Act.

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